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Revisiting fiscal sustainability: panel cointegration 















We assess the sustainability of public finances in OECD countries, over the period 1970-2010, 
using unit root and cointegration analysis, both country and panel based, controlling for 
endogenous breaks. Results notably show: lack of cointegration – absence of sustainability – 
between government revenues and expenditures for most countries (except for Austria, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK); improvements of the primary balance 
after past worsening in debt ratios for Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and 
the UK; Granger causality from government debt to the primary balance for 12 countries 
(suggesting the existence of Ricardian regimes). Overall, fiscal policy has been less sustainable 
for several countries, and panel data results corroborate the time-series findings. 
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The importance of sustainable public finances has received increasing attention particularly 
in the context and following the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis. Sustainable fiscal 
policies can be continued indefinitely without any change in the policy stance, and when the 
intertemporal government budget constraint holds in present value terms. Conversely, if 
budgetary imbalances prevail, economic policies at both macro and microeconomic levels will 
quickly become unsupportable and changes would be required. If such a phenomenon occurs, 
then fiscal imbalances would imply a need for larger and more painful adjustments for the 
economy.  
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate and draw some policy lessons on the 
sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 18 OECD countries, using annual data over the period 
1970-2010. Besides answering this policy question, we are also interested, among other things, 
in ascertaining the causal direction between government expenditures and revenues. The causal 
direction between the two budgetary variables may provide useful insights into how policy 
makers can manage budget deficits in the future. In our empirical approach we perform a 
systematic analysis of the stationarity properties of the first-differenced stock of government 
debt as well as, on the one hand, the relation between government revenues and expenditures 
and, on the other hand, the relation between primary balances and debt. These approaches 
provide us with an indirect test on the solvency of public finances in these countries. We 
conduct this analysis on a country-by-country basis, by means of several time series techniques, 
for robustness purposes, as well as for the country panel as a whole. 
Our contributions are as follows: i) we combine both individual-country analysis by means of 
(recent) time-series techniques with panel data approaches for completeness and robustness 
purposes; ii) we take a longer time span and make use of uniform and comparable data for 18 
OECD countries; iii) and we explore three different channels to evaluate fiscal sustainability as 
put forward in theoretical terms, that is, by looking at the first-differenced debt ratios, the 
relationship between government revenues and expenditures and, finally, the relationship 
between (lagged) public debt and primary balances. 
Our results show that the first-differenced debt series for most countries is non-stationarity 
suggesting that the solvency condition would not be satisfied. Moreover, evidence suggests the 
existence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 countries between revenues and 
expenditures. However, the overall test results allow the rejection of the cointegration 
hypothesis in both relationships under scrutiny. In other words, government expenditures, in 
half of the countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than government revenues, challenging 
therefore the hypothesis of fiscal sustainability.  
On the other hand, the cointegrating coefficients for the revenues-expenditures relationship 
are positive (but less than one) and statistically significant, meaning that for each percentage 
point of GDP increase in public expenditures, revenues increase by less than one percentage 
point of GDP. In terms of causality, our evidence suggests stronger effects running from 
revenues to expenditures and most countries are not able to generate the revenues required to 
finance the planned expenditures. We find Granger-causality from government debt to the 
primary balance, which can be seen as evidence of the existence of a Ricardian regime.  
Finally, panel data results corroborate time-series findings, and even though we find that 
long-run causality seems to run from lagged debt to the primary balance, on average the 
marginal long-run impact is zero. All in all, we cannot say that fiscal policy has been sustainable 
for most countries in our sample. 
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1. Introduction  
The importance of sustainable public finances has received increasing attention particularly 
in the context and following the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis. From a fiscal 
perspective, maintaining a stable long-term relationship between expenditures and revenues is 
one of the key requirements for a stable macroeconomic environment and a sustainable 
economy. Therefore, our purpose is to find out whether fiscal imbalances in a number of OECD 
countries need to be curtailed before they become economically unsustainable, leading to 
insolvency situations. 
Sustainable fiscal policies can be continued indefinitely without any change in the policy 
stance, and when the intertemporal government budget constraint holds in present value terms.1 
Conversely, if budgetary imbalances prevail, economic policies at both macro and 
microeconomic levels will quickly become unsupportable and changes would be required. If 
such a phenomenon occurs, then fiscal imbalances would imply a need for larger and more 
painful adjustments for the economy. Given the detrimental impact of persistent deficits, 
practices on debt sustainability and appropriate fiscal policies are extremely important. For 
instance, Blanchard et al. (1990) present as a definition of a sustainable fiscal policy one that 
allows, in the short-term, that the debt-to-GDP ratio returns to its original level after some 
excessive variation. 
There has been a substantial volume of empirical studies focusing on fiscal sustainability, 
tackling explicit government liabilities, looking notably at the US and European cases (see, 
Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Trehan and Walsh, 1991; MacDonald, 
1992; Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; Quintos, 1995; Makrydakis et al., 1999; Feve and Henin, 2000; 
Martin, 2000; Bravo and Silvestre, 2002; Hatemi-J, 2002; Afonso, 2005, Mendoza and Ostry, 
2007; Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007; Afonso, 2008; Afonso and Rault, 2010; Afonso and Jalles, 
2011, to name a few). In particular, Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Afonso (2008) are of interest 
in what follows since they emphasize the relationship between primary balances and 
government debt. In addition, Fincke and Greiner (2011), and Legrenzi and Milas (2011) focus 
on the possibility of finding structural breaks or possible non-linearities notably vis-à-vis debt 
thresholds, also in a fiscal reaction approach.2 
_____________________________ 
1 Analysis on fiscal sustainability has focused on both the univariate properties of government debt (e.g. Hamilton 
and Flavin, 1986) and on the long-run relationship between government revenues and expenditures (e.g. Hakkio 
and Rush, 1991). 
2 Regarding the specification of fiscal reaction functions, not the main purpose of the current paper, Afonso and 
Jalles (2011) have tackled the issue also in a multi-country framework.  
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On the other hand, Bohn (2007) provides a substantial challenge to the time series literature 
on fiscal policy. Specifically, Bohn suggested that rejections of stationarity-based sustainability 
tests are invalid because in an infinite sample, any order of integration of debt is consistent with 
the transversality condition which implies that the intertemporal budget constraint may be 
satisfied even if these particular time series tests are not. Instead, Bohn (2007) emphasizes 
whether a country’s primary balance responds positively to debt as an indicator of sustainability. 
As in Bohn (1998), this depends upon the assumption that the series are stationary, or when they 
are nonstationary, for them to be related in a statistical sense, they must be of the same order of 
integration and the primary balance and government debt must be cointegrated. 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate and draw some policy lessons on the 
sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 18 OECD countries. Besides answering this policy 
question, we are also interested, among other things, in ascertaining the causal direction between 
government expenditures and revenues. The causal direction between the two budgetary 
variables may provide useful insights into how policy makers can manage budget deficits in the 
future. In our empirical approach we perform a systematic analysis of the stationarity properties 
of the first-differenced stock of government debt as well as, on the one hand, the relation 
between government revenues and expenditures and, on the other hand, the relation between 
primary balances and debt, in line with Bohn (1998). These approaches provide us with an 
indirect test on the solvency of public finances in these countries. We conduct this analysis on a 
country-by-country basis, by means of several time series techniques, for robustness purposes, 
as well as for the panel as a whole, using annual data over the period 1970-2010. 
Thus, our contributions are as follows: i) we combine both individual-country analysis by 
means of (recent) time-series techniques with panel data approaches for completeness and 
robustness purposes; ii) we take a longer time span and make use of uniform and comparable 
data for 18 OECD countries; iii) we identified structural breaks in the series and in the 
cointegration relations; iv) and we explore three different channels to evaluate fiscal 
sustainability as put forward in theoretical terms, that is, by looking at the first-differenced debt 
ratios, the relationship between government revenues and expenditures and, finally, the 
relationship between (lagged) public debt and primary balances. 
Briefly, our results show that the first-differenced debt series for most countries is non-
stationarity suggesting that the solvency condition would not be satisfied. Moreover, evidence 
suggests the existence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 countries between revenues 
and expenditures. However, the overall test results allow the rejection of the cointegration 
hypothesis in both relationships under scrutiny. In other words, for the period 1970-2010, 
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government expenditures, in half of the countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than 
government revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal sustainability.  
On the other hand, the cointegrating coefficients for the revenues-expenditures relationship 
are positive (but less than one) and statistically significant, meaning that for each percentage 
point of GDP increase in public expenditures, revenues increase by less than one percentage 
point of GDP. In terms of causality, our evidence suggests stronger effects running from 
revenues to expenditures and most countries are not able to generate the revenues required to 
finance the planned expenditures. We find Granger-causality from government debt to the 
primary balance, which can be seen as evidence of the existence of a Ricardian regime. Finally, 
panel data analysis corroborates time-series findings and even though we find that long-run 
causality seems to run from lagged debt to the primary balance, on average the marginal long-
run impact is zero. All in all, we cannot say that fiscal policy has been sustainable for most 
countries in our sample. 
     The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the underlying theoretical 
framework which serves as the basis for the empirical strategy that follows. Section 3 presents 
the time-series and panel data econometric methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses our 
main results and findings. The last section concludes. 
     
2. Theoretical Framework  
Regarding the sustainability of fiscal policy the empirical literature usually tests for the 
possibility of both public expenditures and government revenues continuing their historical 
growth patterns. In principle, any value for the budget deficit would be possible if the 
government could raise its liabilities without limit, which is naturally impossible since the 
government is faced with the present value of its own budget constraint.  
The government budget constraint can be used to derive the present value of the budget 
constraint. The flow budget constraint is written as: 
 
ttttt BRBrG +=++ −1)1(  (1) 
where: G – government expenditures, excluding interest payments; R – government revenues;  B 
– public debt; r – real interest rate. 
Rewriting equation (1) for the subsequent periods, and recursively solving leads to the 





































When the second term in the right-hand side of (2) is zero, the present value of the existing 
stock of public debt will be identical to the present value of future primary surpluses. However, 
it is more useful to make several algebraic modifications to equation (1) to obtain an appropriate 
specification for the empirical tests. Assuming that the real interest rate is stationary, with mean 
r, and defining: 
 1)( −−+= tttt BrrGE . (3) 

























B . (4) 
A sustainable fiscal policy should ensure that the present value of the stock of public debt, 
the second term of the right-hand side of (4), goes to zero in infinity, constraining the debt to 
grow no faster than the real interest rate, imposing the absence of Ponzi games. Therefore, the 
government needs to achieve future primary surpluses whose present value adds up to the 
current value of the stock of public debt. 
It is also possible to derive the solvency condition, with all the variables defined as a 
percentage of GDP. Thus, the PVBC, with the variables expressed as ratios of GDP, with y 
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Assuming the real interest rate to be stationary, with mean r, and considering also constant 













































b ρ . (6) 
with ttt YBb /= , ttt YEe /=  and ttt YR /=ρ . When r>y it is necessary to introduce a solvency 




















b in order to bound public debt growth. This yields the 
familiar result that fiscal policy will be sustainable if the present value of the future stream of 
primary surpluses, as a percentage of GDP, matches the “inherited” stock of government debt. 
Recalling the PVBC, equation (4), it is possible to present analytically two complementary 
definitions of sustainability that set the background for empirical testing:3 
i) The value of public current debt must be equal to the sum of future primary surpluses: 
_____________________________ 
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In order to test empirically the absence of Ponzi games, one can test the stationarity of the 
first difference of the stock of public debt ( tB∆ ) and the cointegration between primary balance 
(s) and the (lagged) stock of the public debt, in line with Bohn (2007), using the following 
cointegration regression: ttt uBs ++= −1βα . This, so called, “backward-looking” approach 
implies that an increase in the previous level of debt would result in a larger primary balance 
today.  
Such relationship has been explored notably by Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009) through the lenses 
of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (see, e.g., Leeper 1991, Kocherlakota and Phelan, 1999, 
survey and McCallum and Nelson, 2005, critical appraisal) and the distinction between what is 
referred in the literature as a Ricardian or Monetary-dominant regime (hereafter MD) (“active” 
monetary policy, being the determination of prices its nominal anchor; “passive” fiscal policy 
with the budget balance path being endogenous) and a non-Ricardian or Fiscal-dominant regime 
(hereafter FD) (which allows fiscal policy to set primary balances – “active” – and to follow an 
arbitrary process, not necessarily compatible with solvency). These concepts will be further 
addressed when discussing our empirical results in Section 4. 
It is also possible to assess fiscal policy sustainability through cointegration between 
government revenues and expenditures. The implicit hypothesis concerning the real interest rate, 
with mean r, is also stationarity. Using 1)( −−+= tttt BrrGE , and 1−+= tttt BrGGG , the 

























RGG  (9) 
and with the no-Ponzi game condition,  tGG  and  tR  must be co-integrated variables of order 
one for their first differences to be stationary. 
Therefore the procedure to assess the sustainability of the intertemporal government budget 
constraint involves testing the following cointegration regression: ttt uGGR ++= βα . If the 
null of no co-integration is rejected, the residual tu  must be stationary, and should not display a 
unit root. Hakkio and Rush (1991) demonstrate that if GG and R are non-stationary variables in 
levels, the condition 0 < b < 1 is a sufficient condition for the budget constraint to be obeyed. 
 9 
However, when revenues and expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP or in per 
capita terms, it is necessary to have b = 1 in order for the trajectory of the debt to GDP not to 
diverge in an infinite horizon. 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
3.1. Time series 
3.1.1. Unit Roots and Structural Breaks 
Stationarity-wise, unit root tests can provide a valuable insight into the presence of either a 
deterministic or stochastic secular component in the series. In this context, in addition to 
standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests – for purposes 
of robustness and completeness4 – we also conduct the four tests (M-tests) proposed by Ng and 
Perron (2001) (NP) based on modified information criteria (MIC): the modified Phillips-Perron 
test αMZ ; the modified Sargan-Bhargava test (MSB); the modified point optimal test TMP ; and 
the modified Phillips-Perron TMZ . These improve the PP-tests both with regard to size 
distortions and power. 
We then resort to unit root tests allowing for breaks and we begin with the Zivot-Andrews 
(1992) (ZA) one. This endogenous structural break test is a sequential test which utilizes the full 
sample and uses a different dummy variable for each possible break date. The break date is 
selected where the t-statistic from the ADF test of unit root is at a minimum (most negative). 
Consequently a break date will be chosen where the evidence is least favourable for the unit root 
null.5  We complement with the modified ADF test proposed by Vogelsang and Perron (1998) 
(VP) also allowing for one endogenously determined break. Finally, we take the two-break unit 
root test described by Clemente, Montanes and Reyes (1998) (CMR).6 These test the null of unit 
root against the break-stationary alternative hypothesis and provide us supplementary insights 
vis-à-vis conventional unit root tests that do not account for any break in the data. 
For the unit root tests that allow for one or two endogenously determined breaks it is assumed 
that the shift can be modelled by a dummy variable 0=tDU  for t≤TB and for t>TB, where TB 
is the shift date (time break). In the time series literature, two generating mechanisms of shifts 
are distinguished, additive outlier (AO) and innovational outlier (IO) models. The former results 
_____________________________ 
4 Moreover, these tests are especially appropriate under certain dynamic data structure, and when their random 
components are not white noise. 
5 The critical values in Zivot and Andrews (1992) are different to the critical values in Perron (1989). The 
difference is due to the fact that the selection of the time of the break is treated as the outcome of an estimation 
procedure, rather than predetermined exogenously. 
6 For more detailed discussion of these tests that allow for endogenously determined breaks, the reader should refer 
to the original references. 
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in an abrupt shift in the level, whereas the latter allows for a smooth shift from the initial level to 
a new level. Although both results are reported, we will mainly discuss tests constructed for AO 
models. As discussed in Vogelsang and Perron (1998), who consider an unknown shift date 
situation, the AO framework may be preferable to the IO statistics, even if the Data Generating 
Process (DGP) is an IO process.  
However, it is important to recognize some important drawbacks in both previous unit root 
tests, particularly, the ZA and VP tests. In particular, with relation to the VP test, it has been 
shown that the critical values are substantially smaller in the I(0) case than in the I(1) case 
(therefore, suggesting that the test is conservative in the I(0) case). The solution was then to 
devise a procedure that would have the same limit distribution in both cases. This was first 
attempted by Vogelsang (2001) but simulations provided support for the lack of power in the 
I(1) case. Perron and Yabu (2009) (PY) were more successful on this endeavour by proposing a 
new test for structural changes in the trend function of the time series without any prior 
knowledge of whether the noise component was stationary or integrated and making use of 
Andrews and Ploberger’s (1994) exponential functional and Roy and Fuller’s (2001) finite 
sample correction procedure. This newer test has better properties in terms of size and power.7 
 
3.1.2 Cointegration, Stability and Causality 
Consider the following two cointegrating-relationship regressions, as identified in Section 2: 
 ttt uBs ++= −1βα . (10) 
 ttt uGGR ++= βα . (11) 
where tB  is the government debt and ts  is the government primary balance; tR  are government 
revenues and tGG  government expenditures. tu  is an iid disturbance term satisfying standard 
assumptions. 
Given the nonstationarity of each individual time series (to be tested and confirmed in 
Section 5), the relevant question becomes whether a linear combination of these two pairs of 
variables is stationary. If such a combination exists, government revenues and expenditures 
(government debt and primary balance) become cointegrated,8 which implies that the variables 
are attracted to a stable long-run (equilibrium) relation and any deviation from this relation 
reflected short-run (temporary) disequilibria. A remark is worth making with respect to equation 
(10): if a positive and significant coefficient is to be found that would be a sufficient condition 
_____________________________ 
7 We thank Pierre Perron and Tomoyoshi Yabu for providing their GAUSS code. 
8 To test for cointegration all variables must be integrated of the same order.  
 11 
for solvency, indicating that the government satisfies its present-value budget constraint. A 
problem with such finding is that it is compatible with both the MD and FD regimes.9 Hence, 
we will combine cointegration with Granger-causality analysis. 
We test for cointegrating (long-run) relations between government revenues and expenditures 
(primary balance and government debt) using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) methodology. 
This approach estimates the long-run attracting set in a VAR context that incorporates both the 
short- and long-run dynamics of the various models.  
However, and as in the case of unit roots, a test for co-integration that does not take into 
account possible breaks in the long-run relationship will have lower power. The test will tend to 
under-reject the null of no co-integration if there is a co-integration relationship that has 
changed at some time during the sample period. Therefore, to further evaluate the previous 
results, one should also entertain the possibility that the series are co-integrated but that the 
linear combination has shifted at an unknown point in the data sample, in other words, that there 
might be a relevant break date. Following Gregory and Hansen (1996), the hypothesis of a 
structural shift in the co-integration relationships is then studied.10 
In order to estimate the parameter β  in both equations (10) and (11) we resort to the method 
of Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) of Stock and Watson (1993), following the 
methodology proposed by Shin (1994). This method has the advantage of providing a robust 
correction to the possible presence of endogeneity in the explanatory variable, as well as of 
serial correlation in the error terms of the OLS estimation. 
As emphasized by Bruggemann et al. (2003), it is of some importance to formally investigate 
the stability of the cointegrating vectors further, once a long-run relationship has been identified. 
The temporal stability of estimated relations is also indicative of the usefulness of these relations 
for policy (forecasting) purposes. Hansen and Johansen (1993) outline a procedure that formally 
tests the constancy of cointegrating vectors in the context of Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) estimations. Holding the short-run dynamics of the model constant, the 
procedure then treats these estimates as the null hypothesis in consecutive recursive tests. In this 
way, any rejection of the null of cointegration stability (constancy) should emanate from a 
breakdown in the long-run relation, rather than from any positive shift in the underlying short-
_____________________________ 
9 In a MD regime we would observe that an increase in previous’ period debt would lead to a larger primary 
balancel ex-post. Equivalently, in a FD regime, a derease in the expected primary balance would lead to a decrease 
in the current debt ratio, through a price increase. 
10 The authors have extended the Engle-Granger model to allow for a single break in the co-integration relationship. 
We thank Bruce Hansen for making the GAUSS routine available.  
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run dynamics (Hoffmann et al., 1995). We apply this approach to test the stability of the 
cointegrating relation.  
Moreover, by taking a VAR approach we can use one further important tool: Granger-
causality tests. Many tests of Granger-type causality have been derived and implemented to test 
the direction of causality – Granger (1969), Sims (1972) and Gweke et al. (1983). These tests 
are based on null hypotheses formulated as zero restrictions on the coefficients of the lags of a 
subset of the variables. Thus, the tests are grounded in asymptotic theory. Other shortcomings of 
these tests have been discussed in Toda and Phillips (1994). Also, it is well documented that the 
exclusion of relevant variables induces spurious significance and inefficient estimates. In 
dealing with these problems and for robustness purposes, we employ Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) and Dolado and Lutkepohl (1996) approach for Granger causality. They suggest a 
technique that is applicable irrespective of the integration and cointegration properties of the 
system. The method involves using a Modified Wald statistic for testing the significance of the 
parameters of a VAR(s) model (where s is the lag length in the system).11  
We follow Rambaldi and Doran (1996) in formulating these tests. Define maxd as the 
maximum order of integration in the system, a VAR( maxdk + ) has to be estimated to use the 
Modified Wald test for linear restrictions on the parameters of a VAR(k) which has an 
asymptotic 2χ distribution.12 In our case, we will run a 2 variables’ VAR (for i) government 
revenues and expenditures; and ii) primary balance and (lagged) debt), with k=2 (AIC-based) 
and 1max =d but for the sake of notation simplicity, we denote them as 2,1, =iyi . For our 
VAR(3) we estimate the following system of equations: 









































































.                            (12) 
The above system of equations is estimated via the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
method. The test consists of taking the first k VAR coefficient matrix (but not all lagged 
coefficients) to make Granger causal inference. If, e.g., we want to test that ty2 does not 




0 == aaH , where 12
)(i
a  are the 
coefficients of 2,1,2 =− iy it . 
_____________________________ 
11 As demonstrated by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), if variables are integrated of order d, the usual selection 
procedure is valid whenever  dk ≥ . Thus, if  d = 1 , the lag selection is always consistent. 
12 The traditional F tests and its Wald test counterpart to determine whether some parameter of a stable VAR model 
are jointly zero are not valid for non-stationary processes, as the test statistics do not have a standard distribution 
(Toda and Phillips, 1993). 
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There are four main hypotheses with regard to the causal nexus of government revenues and 
expenditures: 
1. One way causation from expenditures to revenues. This suggests that the government 
adjusts revenues to the level of the planned expenditures (see Barro, 1979). 
2. One way causation from revenues to expenditures. Following this hypothesis, the 
authorities adjust their expenditures to the level of the revenue so that control over 
revenues leads to limited growth in the public sector (Friedman, 1978). 
3. Bidirectional causality (fiscal synchronization). This hypothesis is based on the 
equivalence of marginal cost and marginal revenue that the utility-maximizing suppliers 
and demanders of the public services make. That is, the fiscal authorities made 
simultaneous decisions on expenditures and revenues. Hence, the two variables mutually 
reinforce each other. This is the classical view of public finance (Musgrave, 1966). 
4. No causality. The authorities can set the level of expenditures and revenues by rule of 
thumb. This phenomenon reflects the institutional separation of allocation and taxation 
functions of the government (Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992). This view is also consistent 
with no cointegration and a potential sustainability problem. 
It is worth noting that causality per se has implications only for the dynamics of the fiscal 
adjustments process and not for the sustainability condition. The latter depends on the existence 
of the condition outlined earlier. Since causality tests do give estimates of the authorities’ 
reactions to the past fiscal imbalances, it would provide a useful indicator of how the authorities 
may respond to the imbalances in the future. 
 
3.2 Panel Data 
3.2.1 Panel Unit Roots  
Given the notoriously low power of individual country-by-country tests for unit roots and 
cointegration, it may be preferable to pool the time series of interest and conduct panel analysis. 
We implement three different types of panel unit root tests: two first generation tests, namely the 
Im et al. (2003) test (IPS); the Maddala and Wu (1999) test (MW) and one second generation 
test – the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test. The latter is associated with the fact that previous tests do 
not account for cross-sectional dependence of the contemporaneous error terms and failure to 




3.2.2 Panel Cointegration and Panel Causality 
We implement the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (2004). This is a residual-
based test for the null of no cointegration in heterogeneous panels. Two classes of statistics are 
considered in the context of the Pedroni test. The first type is based on pooling the residuals of 
the regression along the within-dimension of the panel, whereas the second type is based on 
pooling the residuals of the regression along the between-dimension of the panel. For the first 
type, the test statistics are the panel v-statistic, the panel ρ -statistic, the panel PP-statistic, and 
the panel ADF-statistic. These statistics are constructed by taking the ratio of the sum of the 
numerators and the sum of the denominators of the analogous conventional time-series statistics 
across the individual members of the panel. The tests for the second type include the group ρ -
statistic, the group PP-statistic, and the group ADF-statistic. They are simply the group mean 
statistics of the conventional individual time series statistics. All statistics have been 
standardised by the means and variances so that they are asymptotically distributed )1,0(N  
under the null of no cointegration. As one-sided tests, large positive values of the panel ρ -
statistic reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. For the remaining statistics, large negative 
values reject the null.13 See Pedroni (2004) for a detailed discussion. 
Assuming that government revenues and expenditures (government debt and primary 
balance) are cointegrated (to be confirmed in Section 5), one thus need to estimate the 
cointegrating coefficients to investigate the long-run relationship between them. We apply the 
between-dimension panel fully modified OLS (FMOLS) (Pedroni, 2000, 2001). The rationale 
for using FMOLS is that in the presence of unit root variables, the effect of superconsistency 
may not dominate the endogeneity effect of the regressors if OLS is employed (Lee et al., 2008). 
Pedroni (2000) showed that the FMOLS approach can be used to draw an inference about 
cointegration with heterogeneous dynamics. FMOLS takes care of endogeneity problem and 
provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients, which can be interpreted as long-run elasticities. 
Individual estimates and standard errors for 0:0 =ibH  in (10) and (11) are reported as well as 
the panel estimation results.14 
Therefore, if in each country the series tR  and tGG  are individually non-stationary but 
together, generally speaking, are cointegrated, we know from the Granger representation 
_____________________________ 
13 Pedroni (1999) shows that the panel ADF and group ADF tests have better small-smaple properties than the other 
tests, hence they are more reliable (Lee et al., 2008). 
14 We thank Peter Pedroni for providing his RATS code. 
 15 
theorem that these series can be represented in the form of a dynamic error correction model 
(ECM). In line with Canning and Pedroni (2008) we estimate the following ECM: 











































,            (13)  
where ititiitit GGbRe βα ˆˆˆˆ −−−= is the disequilibrium term and it represents how far our 
variables are from the equilibrium relationship, and the error correction mechanism estimates 
how this disequilibrium causes the variables to adjust towards equilibrium in order to keep the 
long-run relationship intact. The Granger representation theorem implies that at least one of the 
adjustment coefficients i1λ  or i2λ must be non-zero if a long-run relationship between the 
variables is to hold. According to Caning and Pedroni (2008) one can test hypotheses about 
long-run effects by testing restrictions on the estimated coefficients in the dynamic ECM. 
Hence, a test for the significance of i1λ ( i2λ ) for any one country can be interpreted as a test 
of whether shocks or innovations in government expenditures (revenues) have a long-run effect 
on government revenues (expenditures) and a test for the sign of the ratio ii 21 / λλ− can be 
interpreted as a test of the sign of the long-run effect of shocks or innovations to government 
expenditures on revenues. In the next Section we present and discuss our main findings. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Stylised Facts and Data Overview  
Most data are taken from the European Commission AMECO (Annual MacroEconomic 
Data) database, covering the period 1970-2010 for the 18 OECD countries considered in our 
sample. For Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA, primary balance (% of GDP) data comes 
from the OECD database. Government Debt (% of GDP) series are retrieved from the recently 
compiled Abbas et al. (2010) dataset. Appendix A provides additional information on variables, 
definitions and their sources. 
A brief characterization of the data seems appropriate to begin with. The consequences of 
choosing different fiscal policies may be exemplified by looking at the public debt paths in these 
countries, as depicted in Figure 1. It is clear from this chart that government debt-to-GDP ratios 
peaked after the 1970s till the end of the 1990s – with the exception of Japan where debt kept on 
rising. Government debt restarted an increasing trend with the 2008 economic crisis and the 
continuous worsening state of public finances in most advanced economies.  
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Figure 1: Public Debt Series: 1970-2010 (selected countries) 
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                     Source: Abbas et al. (2010). 
 
For instance, government debt increased in Italy from an average of 51.8% of GDP in the 
1970s to an average of 112.3% in the 2000s. In the case of Greece, Italy and Japan government 
debt has surpassed 100% of GDP, an average value that was kept during the 2000s. In the cases 
of Belgium and Italy, their high debt service payments induced substantial budget deficits 
despite primary surpluses. A reversal of that general trend is noticeable only at the end of the 
1990s, as several “more indebted” European countries tried to fulfil or at least come closer to the 
Maastricht criteria (much of that effort was reversed in the most recent crisis). All in all, the 
main conclusion is that the burden of government debt has increased over time in almost every 
country under scrutiny. 
Plotting an equivalent graph for total government expenditures and revenues (% GDP) 
yields Figure 2 (for the same selected countries). This visual inspection may help to assess 
sustainability issues in individual cases. 
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Figure 2: Total Government Expenditures and Revenues: 1970-2010 (selected countries) 
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We continue with some descriptive statistics and in order to evaluate the possibility of the 
presence of a cyclical component in the series, objects such as the correlogram and the power 
spectrum can provide useful information. If sometimes the correlogram shows only small 
individual autocorrelations not providing enough strong evidence of the presence of cyclical 
movement in the series (despite some cycle evidence may be buried with noise), then a much 
clearer message emerges from the examination of the spectrum (not shown). Figure 3 shows the 
extracted (Structural Time Series Model-based)15 annual trend growth for total government debt, 
total government expenditures and total government revenues (all in % GDP), respectively in 
panels (a), (b) and (c) for France, Japan, the UK and the US (for reasons of parsimony).16  
_____________________________ 
15 See Harvey (1989, 1991) for details. This class of models is preferred to other trend-cycle filters, as the HP. This 
one, which has been employed widely in the recent RBC literature, is not considered appropriate as it explicitly 
neglets low frequency swings by assumption and Harvey and Jaeger (1993) show that the HP filter may create 
spurious cycles and other distortions. 
16 Upon careful examination of several descriptive statistics, a likely specification for the trend and the cycle has 
been estimated. For reasons of parsimony, basic diagnostic, goodness-of-fit statistics and estimated variances for 
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A few facts are worth noticing. Looking at Figure 3 a) we see that following Japan’s crisis in 
the early 1990s we observe a rise in the country’s debt trend growth till around 2000. It then 
decreased slightly until regaining impetus following the latest 2007-08 economic and financial 
crisis. For France, UK and US the biggest jump in the debt trend growth took place after the 
latest 2007-08 crisis. In panel b) the highest expenditures trend growth is attributed to the US 
which has been rising since the early 2000s and the events following the 9/11 of 2001 and wars 
against terror. Finally, the latest crisis has naturally affected the inflows of government revenues 
(panel c) ) with the most dramatic falls taking place once again in the US following the 9/11 and 
the latest crisis. 
 
Figure 3: Trend Growth of Debt, Expenditures and Revenues, 1970-2010 
(a) 
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the hyperparameters for different structural time series models are available upon request.  All these models 
assumed the presence of a trend, one cycle and an irregular component. Three STMs were considered: the first 
statistical specification assumed that the trend component follows a random walk with drift, with a deterministic 
slope; the second introduced a somewhat smoother trend with a deterministic level and a stochastic slope; finally, 
we had a local linear trend model, which stipulates the level and slope to be stochastic. The best model was selected 
based, primarily, on both AIC and BIC Information Criteria (amongst others) and this corresponds to the version(s) 
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4.2 Country Analysis 
 The fact that our series are in ratio to GDP does not rule them out being integrated 
processes (see, Ahmed and Yoo, 1989). Hence, we now focus on fiscal policy sustainability for 
each of the 18 countries by means of several unit root tests in an attempt to validate the 
sufficient sustainability condition using the stock of government debt. Table 1.a shows the 
stationarity tests results for the first difference of the debt ratio for the period 1970-2010. 
The results for the ADF and PP test (considering both a constant and a time trend) allow the 
rejection of the null of a unit root only in Australia, Germany, Greece and the UK. Therefore the 
series of the first difference of government debt might be I(0) and the solvency condition would 
be satisfied in those cases since non-stationarity can be rejected. The Ng and Perron (2001) tests 
add Finland, Netherlands and Portugal to the “rejection-of-the-null” set of countries.17 
[Table 1.a] 
The previous set of results assumes that there is no structural break in the government debt 
series. However, this might not be the case in some countries – for example, in periods of war or 
important economic downturns. In the presence of structural changes in the trend function, ADF 
and PP tests that do not take into account the break in the series have low power, and are biased 
toward the non-rejection of a unit root. Therefore, in Table 1.a we also report the identified 
structural breaks. Depending on the precise test, we may get different results for break dates, 
with the overwhelmingly conclusion that most series are I(1), apart from Australia, Canada, 
Denmark and Finland for the ZA, VP and CMR tests. For instance, we get reported breaks for 
Finland in 1990-1993, time when the country was experiencing a severe recession. For Portugal 
_____________________________ 
17 One should also note that the number of observations used is only 41 at most, and the accuracy problems of unit-
root tests with small samples are well known. Afonso and Jalles (2011) make use of the longer time series debt data 
going back to the late 19th century to study fiscal sustainability, and such considerations do not apply. 
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we get dates around 1974, 1982-83 and 2003, corresponding to the “Carnation Revolution”, the 
IMF program intervention and one severe recession, respectively.18 One can also note the 
different power attributed to the PY2009 test (particularly as the ZA and VP tests are 
conservative in the I(0) case, and have lack of power in the I(1) case) where in all but 4 cases we 
reject the null of unit root.  
Turning to total government expenditures, total government revenues and the primary 
balance series (all in % GDP)  - Table 1.b - we find similar results, with the non-rejection of the 
null of unit root in levels for most countries (apart from Australia in the case of expenditures and 
primary balance, and Germany and Sweden in the case of the primary balance). We observe 
fewer rejections of the null of unit root in the break-type tests (in particular, Austria, Finland, 
France and the Netherlands for the VP test in the revenues’ case; Austria, Finland and Germany 
for the VP test in the expenditures’ case; and Australia, Austria. Denmark Finland, Netherlands, 
Sweden and the US for the ZA and VP tests in primary balance case). 
[Table 1.b] 
Stationarity aside, we now address the cointegration issue, given by (10) and (11), by 
analysing the relationship between revenues and expenditures and between the primary balance 
and (lagged) debt. Table 2.a presents the results for the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test for 
the former case. We find evidence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 countries 
(Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Japan and Netherlands); whereas in Table 2.b (for the 
latter case), we find evidence of cointegration in 8 countries (Austria, Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). Therefore, one would not reject the idea that public 
finances have been less unsustainable in those countries. Moreover, in these cases results from 
the Hansen-stability test did not reject the null hypothesis that the series are cointegrated at 
conventional levels (with p-values larger than 20%). Overall, test results allow the rejection of 
the cointegration hypothesis for the majority of the countries in both relationships under 
scrutiny.  
 [Table 2.a, 2.b] 
As previously discussed in Section 3.1.1 we further test the hypothesis of a structural shift in 
the cointegration relationship for all countries in our sample, by using the Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) procedure. Table 3 presents our results. After taking into account the possibility of 
breaks in the series, we get for the revenues-expenditure relationship, rejections of the null of no 
_____________________________ 
18 Several studies detect in such periods expansionary fiscal consolidation episodes  (see, Afonso, 2010). 
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cointegration in 9 countries for the ADF* statistic (relatively in line with previous findings);19 
similarly for the balance-(lagged) debt relationship, we reject the null in only 4 countries. In 
other words, for the period 1970-2010, government expenditures, in half of the countries, 
exhibited a higher growth rate than public revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of 
fiscal policy sustainability. 
[Table 3] 
We are now in position to estimate the parameter β  (10) and (11). The estimation is made 
using the DOLS of Stock and Watson (1993) as previously described. The results of the 
estimation of this equation for each country, in terms of the coefficient β  and the statistic µC , a 
LM statistic from the DOLS residuals, which tests for deterministic cointegration (i.e., when no 
trend is present in the regression), appear in Table 4. Two main results can be obtained from 
Table 4.a. First, since most of the cointegration statistics are highly significant at usual levels, 
the null of deterministic cointegration is rejected (less so in the case of the (lagged) debt-primary 
balance relationship). And, second, the estimates of β  are in 15 out of 18 cases positive and 
statistically significant for the revenues-expenditures relationship. Moreover, they are always 
less than one, that is, for each percentage point of GDP increase in public expenditures, for 
instance in Denmark and in Canada, public revenues only increase by respectively 0.70 and 0.33 
percentage points of GDP. In the case of the primary balance-debt relationship we obtain 
positive and statistically significant estimates of β  in 8 out of 18 cases (our results are in line 
with Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009) findings).  
[Table 4.a] 
As two robustness checks, we have redone the exercise by: i) allowing for more lags in (10), 
that is, this time testing cointegration between the primary balance and the second lagged debt 
ratio; and ii) testing cointegration between the primary balance and the lagged debt deviation to 
each country’s mean over the entire period. Results (see Table 4.b) yield positive and 
statistically significant estimates of β  in 9 (7) out of 18 cases for the former (latter) exercise 
and roughly corresponding to the same set of countries.20 Therefore, the conclusion that emerges 
is that we cannot say that fiscal policy has been sustainable for half of the countries in our 
sample.  
_____________________________ 
19 Our results, as most of the results reported in the literature, were obtained without considering additional sources 
of government revenues: for instance, seignorage and privatization revenues. Additionally, government assets 
(wealth) should be taken into account to make judgements about the sustainability of public finances (even though 
data are mostly lacking). 
20 We thank an anonymous referee for helping us explore additional possible channels through which cointegration 
could be realised. 
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[Table 4.b] 
An additional exercise is to explore the causality direction between total government 
revenues and expenditures. Table 5.a present our results for the standard Granger causality test 
but also the Toda-Yamamoto one. In general, focusing on the former test first, evidence suggests 
stronger effects running from revenues to expenditures. In Canada, however, two-way causality 
is found, that is, we have “fiscal synchronization” in line with the assumption of equivalency 
between the marginal costs and marginal revenues that the utility-maximization suppliers and 
demanders of the public services make. It seems that in only 6 cases we have causality running 
from expenditures to revenues  (the “spend and tax” hypothesis), meaning that the majority of 
fiscal authorities are not able to generate the revenues required to finance the planned 
expenditures; that is, the authorities have not kept fiscal budgets under control. Similar 
conclusions result from inspecting the Toda-Yamamoto test with Germany and Netherlands 
emerging as the two cases where two-way causality is present, that is, where we have “fiscal 
synchronization”. 
[Table 5a] 
As remarked before, in equilibrium the fiscal solvency condition holds in both the MD and 
FD regimes and the positive estimates of β  found in Table 4 can be found in both of them. 
Hence, Table 5.b presents the results from the standard Granger-causality tests together with the 
Toda-Yamamoto version, similarly to Table 5.a. Two-way causality was found in Italy in the 
former test, and in Japan and the Netherlands in the latter test. For these countries results from 
causality tests do not allow us to conclude whether fiscal solvency would have followed a MD 
or FD regime between 1970 and 2010. Granger-causality just from primary balance to debt 
appears for Finland, Ireland, Spain and the UK. On the other hand, Granger causality from 
government debt to the primary balance is found for 12 countries, which can be seen as evidence 
of the existence of a Ricardian regime. 
 [Table 5b] 
 
4.3 Panel Analysis 
Tables B1.a and B1.b in Appendix B report the outcome for the full sample of three panel 
unit root tests: two first generation type, namely IPS and MW and one second generation type, 
namely CIPS. They show that the null hypothesis of unit roots for the panel data for debt, total 
government expenditures, revenues and the primary balance cannot be rejected when variables 
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are taken in levels.21 These results strongly indicate that the variables are non-stationary in level 
and stationary in first differences (with the exception of the primary balance with first 
generation panel unit root tests – Table B1, last column). 
Table 6 shows the outcomes of Pedroni’s (1999) cointegration tests between total 
government revenues and expenditures and the primary balance and (lagged) debt. We use four 
within-group tests and three between-group tests to check whether the panel data are 
cointegrated. The columns labelled within-dimension contain the computed value of the 
statistics based on estimators that pool the autoregressive coefficient across different countries 
for the unit root tests on the estimated residuals. The columns labelled between-dimension 
report the computed value of the statistics based on estimators that average individually 
calculated coefficients for each country. Results of the within-group tests and the between-group 
tests show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected. Therefore, the 
relationships identified in equations (10) and (11) are cointegrated for the panel of all countries 
in our sample.22 
[Table 6] 
We then estimate the cointegrating vector using the FMOLS estimator. Table 7 shows the 
coefficients obtained with this estimator. The estimated coefficient for the pool of all countries 
is 0.51 and 0.03 (statistically significant at the 1% level) for the revenues-expenditures and 
primary balance-debt relationships, respectively. Focusing on the former, as before (Table 4), it 
seems that in general the greatest share of results point to a positive long-run co-movement 
between the levels of total government revenues and expenditures. On the second relationship, 
the average result points to solvency, even though, a country-by-country inspection shows that 
only Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK present statistically 
significant positive coefficient estimates for the improvement of the primary balance when there 
is a past worsening of the debt ratio. This result improves slightly if one considers the (lagged) 
debt-mean deviation variable instead. That is, a country-by-country inspection shows that now 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands present 
statistically significant positive coefficient estimates.  
[Table 7] 
_____________________________ 
21 Panel stationarity was also conducted for the debt deviation to the mean for each country in our dataset over the 
entire period. Results are in line with the ones for the original first difference debt variable (see Appendix B). 
22 The same is true if instead of the debt-ratio if one computes the same test statistics for the debt-mean deviation. 
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Turning to the Pedroni causality tests, one should note first that despite the fact that these 
tests can be implemented on a country-by-country basis23, in practice the reliability of these 
various point estimates and associated tests for any one country is likely to be poor given the 
relatively short time sample over which the data are observed. Therefore, our tests will be panel 
based.  In particular, we want to know more about the pervasiveness of a long-run causal effect 
in the panel rather than simply finding that there is at least some long-run causality present in at 
least one specific country. To this end, we use both a group mean based test24 and a lambda-
Pearson based test25. The combination of the group mean and the lambda-Pearson can be 
particularly informative when the underlying parameters of interest are heterogeneous. For 
instance, when 
1λ
t fails to reject he null while 
1λ
P  succeeds in rejecting the null, this can be 
interpreted as a situation in which we do not reject that the average value for i1λ is zero, even 
though we reject that it is pervasively zero in the panel.26 The results for each of these panel 
tests for the direction of long-run causality and the sign of the long-run causal effect are reported 
in Table 8. 
 [Table 8] 
In examining the details of Table 8, panel A, the first note goes to the i1λ parameters as 
reported in columns 2 through 4, which indicate that long-run causality that does not run from 
expenditures to revenues (p-values above 10%). This confirms our earlier “time-series” findings, 
that is, the non-validity of the “Spend and Tax” hypothesis, meaning that most fiscal authorities 
are not able to generate the revenues required to finance the planned expenditures. Turning 
to i2λ , we reject the hypothesis that revenues have a zero average long-run effect globally (group 
mean tests) on spending. The results hold pervasively among individual countries and on 
average for the entire panel (based on the group-mean and Lamba-Pearson tests). The 
_____________________________ 
23 Results are available upon request. 
24 The group mean test is based on the sample average of the individual country i1λ  tests and will allow us to ask 
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25 The lambda-Pearson panel test uses the p-values associated with each of the individual country t-tests to compute 









ln λ is the log of the p-value associated with individual country i’s t-test for the null that 01 =iλ . 
26 This can occur when the value for i1λ is significantly positive for some fraction of the panel and significantly 
negative for another fraction of the panel. In this case, we can say that a long-run causal effect is present, even if for 
some members of the panel it is positive while for others it is negative. 
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implication of these results is that changes in revenues appear to induce permanent changes in 
long-run expenditures. On average the marginal long-run impact is zero. 
Turning to Table 8, panel B, looking at the i1λ parameters we conclude that long-run causality 
seems to run from lagged debt to the primary balance (p-values below 10%). This confirms our 
previous “time-series” results, that is, we cannot reject that government debt Granger causes the 
primary balance. The results hold pervasively among individual countries and on average for the 
entire panel (based on the group-mean and Lamba-Pearson tests). Turning to i2λ , we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that primary balances have a zero average long-run effect globally (group 
mean tests). In other words, there is no long-run causality in this case running from the primary 
balance to government debt. At the same time, the sign of the effect is mixed, so that the average 
is still zero. As before, on average the marginal long-run impact is zero. 
In order to control additionally for other effects on the a fiscal reaction specification as (10), 
we have made the estimation using information on financial crisis The rational is that when such 
crisis occur, the response of primary balances to increases in government indebtedness will tend 
to be lower, given the additional effort asked to public finances under those circumstances. 
Therefore, we use financial crises dummies derived from Leaven and Valencia’s (2010) publicly 
available database, and use them both in an additive and multiplicative (with the debt variable) 
in a pooled estimation of (1).  
[Table 9] 
The results in Table 9 show that financial crisis negatively impinge on the primary balance, 
as expected, and this is a consistently statistically significant result. For instance, in the case of 
the multiplicative dummy, the overall reaction of the primary balance to government debt 
developments may even be reversed, undermining fiscal sustainability.27 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have revisited the issue of fiscal policy sustainability in a sample of 18 
OECD countries, with annual data between 1970 and 2010, by means of both time-series and 
panel data techniques. Our main results point to the non-stationarity of the first-differenced debt 
series for most countries (with the exception of Australia, Germany, Greece and the UK with the 
ADF and PP tests and adding Finland, Netherlands and Portugal with the Ng and Perron tests) 
suggesting that the solvency condition would not be satisfied. We find similar results in the 
_____________________________ 
27 For instance, in column (3) in Table 9, we have: / 0.014 0.049s B FC∂ ∂ = − , implying an effect of -0-035 when a 
financial crisis takes place. 
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cases of total government expenditures, total government revenues and the primary balance 
series, with the non-rejection of the null of unit root (in levels) for most countries. 
Moreover, evidence suggests the existence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 
countries between revenues and expenditures. However, the overall test results allow the 
rejection of the cointegration hypothesis in both relationships under scrutiny. In other words, for 
the period 1970-2010, government expenditures, in half of the countries, exhibited a higher 
growth rate than public revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal policy 
sustainability. 
Estimating the cointegrating coefficient we get 15 out of 18 cases positive and statistically 
significant estimates for the revenues-expenditures relationship and these are always less than 
one, that is, for each percentage point of GDP increase in public expenditures, revenues increase 
by less than one percentage point of GDP. 
In terms of individual-country causality, evidence suggests stronger effects running from 
revenues to expenditures. Moreover in only 6 cases we have causality running from 
expenditures to revenues (the “spend and tax” hypothesis), meaning that the majority of fiscal 
authorities are not able to generate the revenues required to finance the planned expenditures. 
On the other hand, Granger causality from government debt to the primary balance is found for 
12 countries, which can be seen as evidence of the existence of a Ricardian regime. 
Our panel data results corroborate time-series findings with the greatest share of empirical 
evidence pointing to a positive long-run co-movement between the levels of total government 
revenues and expenditures, that is, changes in revenues appear to induce permanent changes in 
long-run expenditures. 
Even tough we find that long-run causality seems to run from lagged debt to the primary 
balance, on average the marginal long-run impact is zero. All in all, we cannot say that fiscal 
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Ameco codes  
Total expenditure: general government, Excessive deficit procedure (% of 
GDP at market prices) 
1.0.319.0.UUTGF, 
1.0.319.0.UUTGE 
Total revenue: general government, Excessive deficit procedure (% of GDP 
at market prices) 
1.0.319.0.URTGF, 
1.0.319.0.URTGE 
General government consolidated gross debt, excessive deficit procedure 





Primary Balance (% GDP at market prices) 1.0.319.0.UBLGI, 
for EU countries; OECD 
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Table B1: First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Panel Unit Root Test (IPS) (a) 
Full debt  
debt-mean 
deviation 
 revenues  expenditures  
primary 
balance 
in levels          
lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] 
          
1.78 -0.63 1.78 -0.64 0.39 -3.56** 1.17 -3.67** 0.78 -4.95** 
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) Panel Unit Root Test (MW) (b) 
Full debt  
debt-mean 
deviation 










in levels           
0 8.06 1.00 8.07 1.00 15.29 0.99 10.96 1.00 26.44 0.87 
1 26.27 0.88 26.27 0.88 20.65 0.98 20.60 0.98 54.40 0.03 
2 23.20 0.95 23.21 0.95 19.37 0.98 22.56 0.96 45.73 0.13 
in first 
differences 
          
0 98.35 0.00 98.36 0.00 345.88 0.00 276.25 0.00 0.18 0.57 
1 54.39 0.02 54.39 0.03 206.00 0.00 142.29 0.00 -0.47 0.32 
2 34.08 0.56 34.09 0.56 161.21 0.00 84.46 0.00 0.45 0.67 
Notes: (a) We report the average of the country-specific “ideal” lag-augmentation (via AIC). We report the t-bar statistic, constructed as 
∑=− ii tNbart )/1( ( it are country ADF t-statistics). Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic has a non-standard 
distribution: the critical values are -1.73 for 5%, -1.69 for 10% significance level – distribution is approximately t. We indicate the cases where the null is rejected 
with **. (b) We report the MW statistic constructed as ∑−= )log(2 ii ppλ ( ip are country ADF statistic p-values) for different lag-augmentations. Under the null 
of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic is distributed )2(2 Nχ . We further report the p-values for each of the MW tests.  
 
Table B2: Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS) 
Full debt  
debt-mean 
deviation 










in levels           
0 4.22 1.00 4.94 1.00 0.32 0.62 1.41 0.92 405.13 0.00 
1 2.29 0.98 2.84 0.99 -0.07 0.47 0.44 0.67 208.96 0.00 
2 3.52 1.00 3.40 1.00 0.62 0.73 1.67 0.95 134.98 0.00 
in first 
differences 
          
0 -5.63 0.00 -5.64 0.00 -13.76 0.00 -12.12 0.00 -15.97 0.00 
1 -2.53 0.00 -2.54 0.01 -7.65 0.00 -5.74 0.00 -11.07 0.00 
2 0.57 0.71 0.57 0.72 -3.82 0.00 -0.82 0.20 -7.47 0.00 
Notes: Null hypothesis of non-stationarity. We further report the p-values for each of the CIPS tests. 
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TABLE 1.a Unit Root Tests and Structural Breaks: First-Differenced Public Debt 1970-
2010 
Countries  
ADF PP NP 
ZA VP(AO) VP(IO) CMR(AO) CMR(IO) PY2009 
     MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Australia -4.98*** -4.98*** -3.66 -1.30 0.35 24.02 2002 2005 2004** 1998, 2005 2004, 2008** 1995*** 
Austria -2.15 -2.42 -8.34 -1.99 0.23 11.07 1992 2003 1999 1988, 2002 1990, 1999** 2002 
Belgium -1.89 -1.78 -6.78 -1.69 0.24 13.53 1990 1989 1979 1985, 2002 1980, 1996 1993*** 
Canada -3.25* -3.39* -13.81 -2.57 0.186 6.92 1992 1988** 1981 1988, 2002 1981, 2002 1991*** 
Denmark -2.18 -2.20 -9.55 -1.91 0.20 10.56 1983 1987** 2004 1984, 2003 1980, 2004 1980*** 
Finland -4.05** -2.09 -31.86*** -3.99*** 0.12*** 2.86*** 1993** 1995 1990** 1985, 1995 1980, 1990** 1990*** 
France -3.04 -3.07 -11.45 -2.37 0.20 8.05 1994 1998 1991 1984, 1995 1981, 1991 2003*** 
Germany -3.96** -3.96** -16.12 -2.83 0.17 5.65 1996 1998 1992 1984, 1997 1974, 1992 2003*** 
Greece -4.95*** -5.03*** -16.11* -2.83* 0.17* 5.67* 1991 1990 1983 1984, 1991 1983, 1989 2000 
Ireland -3.25* -3.19 -14.80* -2.40 0.16** 7.90 1987 1989 1996 1984, 1998 1981, 1996 1995*** 
Italy -3.34* -3.41* -13.99 -2.61 0.18 6.70 1993 1987 1980 1987, 1995 1981, 1990 1999 
Japan -3.04 -3.28* -4.92 -1.56 0.31 18.51 1989 2007 1994 1983, 2001 1992, 1997 2003*** 
Netherlands -3.04 -3.12 -15.4* -2.50 0.16** 7.41 1982 1994 1995 1985, 2003 1981, 1998** 1998*** 
Portugal -1.56 -4.28** -21.06** -3.21** 0.15** 4.51** 1982 1983 1980 1973, 1983 1974, 1980 2003*** 
Spain -2.73 -2.79 -11.39 -2.32 0.20 8.32 1994 1987 1980 1989, 1993 1980, 1989** 1995*** 
Sweden -2.80 -2.93 -10.66 -2.30 0.21 8.54 1997 1984 1979 1984, 2006 1979, 2002 1998*** 
United Kingdom -3.25* -3.34* -12.03 -2.35 0.19 8.08 1990 1977 1978 1977, 1989 1988, 1992 2003 
United States -2.24 -2.23 -11.19 -2.08 0.18 9.48 1986 1988 1981 1988, 1994 1984, 1989 1990*** 
Note: ADF critical values: -4.028, -3.445, -3.145 for 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. For the Ng-Perron test (NP), none of the test statistics are significant at the 
usual levels. The critical values are taken from Ng and Perron (2001), table 1 and the autoregressive truncation lag (zero) has been selected using the modified AIC. 
The ZA test statistic reported is the minimum Dickey-Fuller statistic calculated across all possible breaks in the series, when both a break in the intercept and the time 
trend is allowed for. The year in parenthesis denotes the year when this minimum DF statistic is obtained. The 1% critical value is -5.57 and the 5% critical value is -
5.08. As for the VP test, “AO” means addictive outlier and “IO” means innovational outlier and critical values are taken from Perron and Vogelsang (1992), in 
particular, -3.56 (AO) and -4.27 (IO) for 5% level. As for CMR the 5% critical value is -5.49 (both AO and IO), also taken from Perron and Vogelsang (1992). In 
column 12 we run the Perron-Yabu (PY) unit root test. For the structural-break type tests only dates are presented and when applicable, a statistically significant 





TABLE 1.b Unit Root Tests and Structural Breaks 1970-2010 
Countries/Series 
ADF PP NP 
ZA VP(AO) VP(IO) CMR(AO) CMR(IO) PY2009 
Levels FD Levels FD    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Revenues 
Australia -1.77 -7.60*** -1.77 -7.60*** -5.11 -1.33 0.26 16.7 2004 1981 1980 1981, 1996 1980, 1993 2003*** 
Austria -1.48 -4.69*** -1.39 -6.55*** -1.07 -0.50 0.47 48.18 1976 1977 1974** 1977, 1999 1974, 2000** 1982*** 
Belgium -2.08 -6.50*** -2.07 -6.50*** -3.14 -1.13 0.35 26.22 1977 1978 1973 1976, 1995 1973, 1991 1980 
Canada -0.87 -3.85** -0.64 -4.51*** -5.74 -1.46 0.25 15.43 1990 1983 1978 1987, 2003 1978, 1988 1997*** 
Denmark -0.97 -4.58*** -1.40 -6.82*** -4.43 -1.24 0.28 18.61 1983 1980 1981 1973, 1982 1977, 1982 1984 
Finland -1.61 -5.47*** -1.22 -10.13*** -2.88 -1.01 0.35 26.76 1990 1987 1973** 1972, 1987 1973, 1983 1990 
France -0.51 -5.85*** -0.63 -5.85*** -0.75 -0.34 0.46 48.77 1979 1980 1973** 1979, 1994** 1973, 1991 1985*** 
Germany -2.77 -6.02*** -2.80 -6.01*** -4.32 -1.30 0.30 19.64 1992 1988 1989 1993, 2002 1989, 1999** 2000 
Greece -1.77 -5.46*** -1.92 5.42*** -6.17 -167 0.27 14.70 1997 1991 1988 1983, 1993 1980, 1988 1996 
Ireland -1.47 -6.67*** -1.43 -6.67*** -3.17 -1.19 0.37 27.25 1985 1977 1978 1982, 1996 1978, 1993 1984* 
Italy -0.90 -5.83*** -0.95 -5.82*** -3.03 -1.07 0.35 26.23 1992 1984 1974 1979, 1989 1978, 1988 1991 
Japan -1.80 7.24*** -1.80 -7.24*** -2.95 -1.16 0.39 29.41 1979 1981 1977 1981, 2007 1977, 2004 1991 
Netherlands -2.69 -5.62*** -2.69 5.62*** -1.96 -0.95 0.48 44.07 1994 1994 1992** 1976, 1996 1973, 1992** 1981** 
Portugal -0.66 -7.53*** -1.82 -9.13*** -3.43 1.07 0.31 22.46 1995 1993 1973 1983, 1993 1979, 1990 1991*** 
Spain 0.07 -5.47*** 0.28 -5.46*** -0.53 -0.23 0.44 46.63 1994 1982 1977 1978, 1986 1973, 1978 1993*** 
Sweden -1.73 -6.05*** -1.68 -11.91*** -2.40 -0.88 0.36 29.62 1976 1978 1974 1978, 2002 1974, 1999 1986** 
United Kingdom -3.09 -4.97*** -2.53 -5.26*** -18.85** -3.04** 0.16** 4.98** 1992 1988 1988 1988, 2006 1988, 2002 1989 
United States -2.70 -5.95*** -1.40 -8.76*** -19.03** -2.94** 0.15** 5.63* 2002** 1988** 1985 1988, 1998 1985, 1999 2001*** 
Expenditures 
Australia -4.50*** -4.06*** -3.13 -3.37* -8.14 -1.98 0.24 11.27 1987 1977 1973 1979, 1999 1973, 1979 1985*** 
Austria -1.96 -5.69*** -1.96 -5.69*** -2.15 -0.96 0.44 38.50 1976 1977 1973** 1977, 2004 1973, 2003 1982 
Belgium -2.31 -6.91*** -2.31 -6.87*** -2.87 -1.19 0.41 31.59 1984 1979 1992 1978, 1986 1973, 1986 1983*** 
Canada -1.90 -4.75*** -1.79 -4.75*** -5.49 -1.65 0.30 16.55 1982 2001 1997 1983, 1998 1978, 1997 1995 
Denmark -2.03 -4.61*** -1.93 -4.58*** -6.51 -1.80 0.27 13.99 1980 1978 1972 1980, 2001 1977, 2003 1980 
Finland -2.42 -3.99** -1.74 -3.27* -11.41 -2.37 0.20 8.03 1990 1987 1988** 1987, 1999 1988, 1995 1997* 
France -2.17 -4.95** -1.73 -4.95** -5.19 -1.58 0.30 17.42 1981 1982 1973 1979, 1993 1973, 1979 1985 
Germany -3.07 -4.94** -3.07 -4.80** -5.62 -1.67 0.29 16.20 1991 1976 1972** 1994, 1999 1972, 1988 1980 
Greece -1.76 -7.39*** -1.64 -7.55*** -5.70 -1.64 0.28 15.86 1981 1982 1979 1982, 1991 1972, 1979 1983 
Ireland -2.10 -4.26*** -1.65 -4.21*** -7.11 -1.84 0.25 12.86 1980 1983 1984 1983, 1996 1972, 1993 1988 
Italy -2.10 -4.26*** -1.65 -4.21*** -7.11 -1.84 0.25 12.86 1980 1983 1984 1983, 1996 1972, 1993 1988 
Japan -2.74 -8.12*** -2.66 -8.01*** 6.31 -1.76 0.27 14.42 1984 1995 1991 1976, 1995 1973, 1991 1983*** 
Netherlands -2.01 -4.26*** -1.97 -4.28*** -4.24 -1.45 0.34 21.39 1978 1988** 1992 1977, 1995 1972, 1992 1983 
Portugal -2.62 -4.94*** -1.87 -6.65*** -4.37 -1.45 0.33 20.65 1978 1982 1972 1977, 1992 1973, 1988 1981 
Spain -1.41 -4.21*** -1.40 -4.19** -3.50 -1.31 0.37 25.80 1980 1982 1973 1982, 1991 1973, 1978 1995** 
Sweden -2.17 -4.08** -1.87 -4.06** -6.70 -1.78 0.26 13.62 1981 1978 1972 1978, 1999 1974, 1992 1981** 
United Kingdom -2.49 -3.69** -1.48 -3.76** -16.09* -2.70* 0.16* 6.42* 2002 1989 1983 1987, 2006 1983, 2007 1985 
United States -2.56 -4.65*** -1.93 -4.43*** -15.83* -2.74* 0.17* 6.18* 1997 1983 1978 1983, 1995 1980, 1994 1996 
Primary Balance 
Australia -3.87** -4.52*** -2.46 -3.74** -26.94*** -3.60*** 0.13*** 3.75*** 1986 1989 1984** 1986, 1996 1972, 1984 1985 
Austria -3.70** -4.92*** -2.54 -9.71*** -12.57 -2.43 0.19 7.63 1979 1972** 1994 1972, 1997 1973, 1994 1996 
Belgium -1.66 -7.82*** -1.64 -7.75*** -5.93 -1.58 0.26 15.16 2003 1979 1980 1979, 1986 1980, 1982 1984 
Canada -1.92 -4.94*** -1.75 -4.95*** -9.53 -2.06 0.21 10.02 1996 1990 1992 1991, 1997 1973, 1992 1995*** 
Denmark -3.52* -4.63*** -1.74 -4.13*** -27.40*** -3.63*** 0.13*** 3.69*** 1983 1984 1981** 1985, 1989 1981, 1990 1983 
Finland -3.03 -5.09*** -2.48 -5.02*** -20.70** -3.17** 0.15** 4.68*** 2000 1986** 1987 1991, 1997 1989, 1996 1997 
France -2.46 -6.36*** -2.63 -6.37*** -10.84 -2.16 0.19 9.16 1997 2006 1992 1989, 1997 1990 1997 
Germany -4.38*** -7.96*** -4.15 -11.92*** -17.36** -2.93** 0.16** 5.32* 1977 1993 1994 1983, 1993** 1982, 1994** 1981*** 
Greece -2.06 -6.99** -2.00 -7.00 -7.30 -1.87 0.25 12.52 1994 2005 1989 1991, 2002 1989, 2001 1993 
Ireland 3.82 -0.98 2.60 -0.54 
-15.50*** -27.30*** 0.01*** 0.15*** 2004 2007 1985 1985, 2004 1985,   2003*** 
Italy -1.97 -6.83*** -2..04 -6.94*** -6.37 -1.69 0.26 14.27 1992 1989 1989** 1991, 2002 1990, 1999 1991 
Japan -2.24 -7.56*** -2.15 -7.56*** -8.32 -2.02 0.24 10.99 1993 1996 1990 1984, 1994 1982, 1991 1993*** 
Netherlands -3.30* -7.40*** -3.40* -9.08*** -15.38* -2.59 0.16** 6.94 1996 2006** 1994** 1993, 2001 1994, 1999 1995*** 
Portugal -2.45 -4.08** -2.42 -7.52*** -9.06 -2.04 0.22 10.04 1982 2006 1980 1985, 1990 1973, 1981 1982 
Spain -2.88 -5.34*** -1.65 -4.48*** -22.36** -3..18** 0.14** 4.98** 1986 1997 1984 1979, 1988 1978, 1984 2003 
Sweden -3.94** -4.20** -2.47 -4..23*** -24.49*** -3.49*** 0.14** 3.74*** 1991 1987** 1988** 1987, 1993 1988, 1999 1991 
United Kingdom -3.15 -4.68*** -2.43 -4.66*** -18.67** -2.98** 0.16** 5.28** 1998 2005 1999 1991, 1998 1987, 1999 1997 
United States -2.56 -4.83*** -1.24 -4.66*** -22.19** -3.14** 0.14** 5.18** 1997** 2004** 1999 1995, 2002 1995, 2000 1996*** 
Note: see Table 1.a for details. In this table, instead of using first-differenced variables, these are tested in levels and, in the cases of the ADF and PP tests, also in first-differences, as identified in columns 3 and 5. 
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TABLE 2.a Johansen-Juselius Cointegration Tests: Revenues and Expenditures 
                    
Null Alternative Aus Aut Bel Can Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Jap Net Por Spa Swe UK US 
traceλ  
                   
0=r  1≥r  20.33* 28.84** 14.41 14.53 23.40** 19.12 18.39 30.89** 13.31 14.35 13.79 22.95** 21.04** 18.56 19.55 19.85 19.20 18.78 
1≤r  2≥r  8.66 9.79 1.86 5.91 4.99 7.26 5.88 9.65 4.43 5.01 5.05 2.99 3.30 7.10 8.84 5.55 5.80 4.14 
maxλ  
                   
0=r  1=r  11.66 19.05** 12.55 8.62 18.40** 11.86 12.51 21.23** 8.88 9.33 8.73 19.96** 18.09** 11.46 10.70 14.30 13.39 14.64 
1≤r  2=r  8.66 9.79 1.86 5.91 4.99 7.26 5.88 9.65 4.43 5.01 5.05 2.99 3.30 7.10 8.84 5.55 5.80 4.14 
Cointegration*  Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No No No 
Note: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration  at the 5% level (based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values). 
 
TABLE 2.b Johansen-Juselius Cointegration Tests: (lagged) Debt and Primary Balance 
                    
Null Alternative Aus Aut Bel Can Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Jap Net Por Spa Swe UK US 
traceλ  
                   
0=r  1≥r  12.19 21.16** 18.14 28.08** 19.73 12.68 21.45** 25.83** 4.84 15.07 9.36 16.98** 27.51** 9.41 18.42** 9.63 21.91** 12.80 
1≤r  2≥r  2.01 5.60 5.33 1.63 7.73 1.46 0.86 1.13 0.75 3.04 1.41 0.02 3.64 0.57 0.91 3.17 2.59 0.32 
maxλ  
                   
0=r  1=r  10.17 15.55 12.80 26.45** 11.99 11.21 20.59** 24.69** 4.09 12.02 7.97 16.96** 23.86** 8.84 17.50** 6.46 19.31** 12.47 
1≤r  2=r  2.01 0.22 5.33 1.63 7.73 1.46 0.86 1.13 0.75 3.04 1.41 0.02 3.64 0.57 0.91 3.17 2.59 0.32 
Cointegration*  No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Note: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration  at the 5% level (based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values). 
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TABLE 3. Testing for regime shifts in cointegration: Gregory-Hansen 
relation Revenues and Expenditures (lagged) Debt and Primary Balance 
Country ADF test Phillips Test ADF test Phillips Test 
 *ADF stat Estimated break date *
αZ
 stat Estimated break date *ADF stat Estimated break date *
αZ
 stat Estimated break date 
Australia -3.02 1994 -15.22 2002 -3.52 1993 -17.20 2003 
Austria -4.86** 2003 -29.11 1996 -3.85 1987 -19.92 1989 
Belgium -3.13 1976 -16.63 1994 -3.82 1988 -20.38 1979 
Canada -3.26 2001 -21.95 2001 -3.60 2000 -18.17 1997 
Denmark -5.36** 1983 -27.05 1983 -5.12** 1982 -25.74 1983 
Finland -4.63* 1980 -20.38 1976 -3.13 1989 -18.36 1994 
France -3.27 1996 -20.06 1996 -3.97 1993 -24.27 1992 
Germany -4.92** 2002 -31.81 2001 -3.71 1993 -16.68 1987 
Greece -4.34 1993 -27.26 1994 -4.60* 1996 -28.16 1986 
Ireland -3.86 1983 -24.11 1983 -3.60 1997 -23.78 1997 
Italy -3.56 2000 -20.95 2000 -4.74* 1984 -24.27 1984 
Japan -3.65 1979 -20.85 1995 -3.52 1976 -15.61 2000 
Netherlands -6.54*** 1975 -30.61 1974 -3.04 1996 -19.30 1999 
Portugal -5.10** 2002 -30.67 2003 -26.19*** 1987 -22.98 1996 
Spain -4.39 1982 -15.46 2003 -3.71 1996 -17.77 2001 
Sweden -4.83* 1981 -19.69 1983 -4.12 1999 -13.52 2000 
UK -5.12** 1989 -25.25 1988 -3.50 1996 -21.86 1995 
US -5.81** 2000 -32.07 2000 -3.82 1992 -17.30 1987 
Note: *ADF and *
αZ
refer to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and to the Phillips *
αZ
tests statistics; null of no cointegration. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 
and 1% levels, respectively, using the critical values from Gregory and Hansen (1996), table 1. 
 
TABLE 4.a Estimation of long-run relationships: Stock-Watson-Shin cointegration 
Country\relation Revenues and Expenditures (lagged) Debt and Primary Balance 
 β  2R  µC  β  
2
R  µC  
Australia -0.02 (0.25) 0.77 34.25 (9.16)*** -0.03 (0.17) 0.30 3.43 (5.71) 
Austria 0.67 (0.08)*** 0.92 14.27 (4.13)*** -0.07 (0.08) 0.45 1.36 (1.93) 
Belgium -0.11 (0.19) 0.41 53.25 (10.33)*** 0.06 (0.02)** 0.92 -3.21 (2.10) 
Canada 0.33 (0.10)*** 0.76 26.44 (4.50)*** 0.14 (0.02)*** 0.95 -10.81 (1.26)*** 
Denmark 0.70 (0.10)*** 0.88 16.05 (6.01)** 0.10 (0.06) 0.87 -0.90 (3.44) 
Finland 0.63 (0.05)*** 0.90 20.37 (2.53)*** -0.05 (0.02)*** 0.93 6.69 (0.60)*** 
France 0.69 (0.07)*** 0.95 13.03 (4.01)*** 0.01 (0.01) 0.84 -0.34 (0.46) 
Germany 0.84 (0.16)*** 0.72 4.94 (7.68) -0.02 (0.02) 0.67 1.78 (0.91)* 
Greece 0.61 (0.16)*** 0.82 10.42 (7.16) 0.12 (0.04)*** 0.73 -11.22 (3.97)** 
Ireland 0.38 (0.15)** 0.64 21.52 (6.34)*** 0.13 (0.05)** 0.66 -7.33 (3.44)** 
Italy -0.30 (0.30) 0.50 52.92 (12.76)*** 0.12 (0.02)*** 0.89 -10.64 (1.78)*** 
Japan 0.37 (0.16)** 0.69 18.75 (5.68)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.90 1.15 (0.45)** 
Netherlands 0.67 (0.05)*** 0.93 14.36 (2.56)*** 0.01 (0.03) 0.52 0.38 (2.29) 
Portugal 0.98 (0.12)*** 0.92 3.94 (5.47) -0.13 (0.12) 0.57 7.17 (6.78) 
Spain 0.89 (0.06)*** 0.96 1.32 (2.78) 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.88 -1.23 (0.57)** 
Sweden 0.61 (0.07)*** 0.79 21.83 (4.43)*** -0.04 (0.04) 0.82 6.93 (2.63)** 
United Kingdom 0.56 (0.16)*** 0.58 15.52 (7.51)** 0.04 (0.04) 0.89 -0.99 (-0.60) 
United States 0.46 (0.14)*** 0.66 16.22 (5.12)*** 0.03 (0.02) 0.81 -1.60 (0.99) 
Note: The 
µC
 is the Shin (1994) LM statistic which tests for deterministic cointegration. The critical values are taken from Shin (1994), Table 1, for m=1. Standard errors in 
parentheses, adjusted for long-run variance. The long-run variance of the cointegrating regression residuals was estimated using the Barlett window with 
)(6 2/1TINTl ≈= as proposed by Newey and West (1987). The number of leads and lags selected was )(3 3/1TINTq ≈= as proposed in Stock and Watson (1993). *, 
** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 4.b Estimation of long-run relationships (robustness): Stock-Watson-Shin cointegration 
Country\relation (lagged) Debt-mean deviation and Primary 
Balance 
(twice lagged) Debt and Primary Balance 
 β  2R  µC  β  
2
R  µC  
Australia 0.04 (0.05) 0.09 2.18 (0.29)*** 0.25 (0.09)** 0.52 -6.02 (3.18)* 
Austria -0.05 (0.05) 0.21 0.32 (0.29) -0.03 (0.05) 0.26 0.71 (1.14) 
Belgium 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.90 2.00 (0.25)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.87 -5.19 (0.94)*** 
Canada 0.14 (0.01)*** 0.93 -0.51 (0.22)** 0.16 (0.02)*** 0.86 -11.65 (1.09)*** 
Denmark 0.04 (0.05) 0.57 4.86 (0.67)*** 0.08 (0.05)* 0.63 0.17 (2.54) 
Finland -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.87 5.07 (0.26)*** -0.03 (0.021)* 0.62 5.69 (0.72)*** 
France 0.01 (0.01) 0.75 0.38 (0.15)** -0.01 (0.01) 0.55 0.07 (0.55) 
Germany 0.02 (0.01) 0.63 1.34 (0.24)*** 0.04 (0.02)* 0.21 -1.56 (1.20) 
Greece 0.06 (0.03)* 0.39 -0.94 (1.05) 0.05 (0.03) 0.20 -5.41 (2.88)* 
Ireland 0.08 (0.03)** 0.62 0.48 (0.73) 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.63 -6.72 (2.21)*** 
Italy 0.12 (0.01)*** 0.87 -0.06 (0.40) 0.13 (0.02)*** 0.84 -11.26 (1.45)*** 
Japan 0.01 (0.01) 0.85 1.92 (0.43)*** 0.01 (0.01) 0.62 0.53 (0.85) 
Netherlands 0.01 (0.01) 0.36 1.70 (0.27)*** 0.04 (0.02)* 0.26 -0.83 (1.49) 
Portugal -0.01 (0.04) 0.32 0.03 (0.36) 0.02 (0.06) 0.16 -1.79 (2.98) 
Spain 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.81 0.28 (0.20) 0.04 (0.01)** 0.53 -1.74 (0.84)** 
Sweden -0.02 (0.03) 0.69 3.95 (0.61)*** 0.001 (0.04) 0.54 3.37 (2.41) 
United Kingdom 0.03 (0.07) 0.52 0.68 (0.43) 0.11 (0.08) 0.47 -4.45 (3.80) 
United States 0.04 (0.02)** 0.76 -0.05 (0.26) 0.03 (0.03) 0.59 -2.13 (1.46) 
Note: The 
µC
 is the Shin (1994) LM statistic which tests for deterministic cointegration. The critical values are taken from Shin (1994), Table 1, for m=1. Standard errors in 
parentheses, adjusted for long-run variance. The long-run variance of the cointegrating regression residuals was estimated using the Barlett window with 
)(6 2/1TINTl ≈= as proposed by Newey and West (1987). The number of leads and lags selected was )(3 3/1TINTq ≈= as proposed in Stock and Watson (1993). *, 




TABLE 5.a Causality tests – Revenues and Expenditures 
Country\relation Standard Granger causality Toda-Yamamoto 
 RGG →  Yes/No GGR →  Yes/No RGG →  Yes/No GGR →  Yes/No 
Australia 3.58 No 5.21* Yes 2.88 No 6.86** Yes 
Austria 6.01** Yes 0.88 No 4.21 No 2.56 No 
Belgium 1.74 No 0.22 No 0.30 No 1.30 No 
Canada 6.02** Yes 15.48*** Yes 1.50 No 10.25*** Yes 
Denmark 1.03 No 13.08*** Yes 0.56 No 1.51 No 
Finland 1.15 No 5.07* Yes 7.40** Yes 2.20 No 
France 1.66 No 4.85* Yes 1.37 No 6.29** Yes 
Germany 4.46  No 7.56** Yes 5.09* Yes 9.73*** Yes 
Greece 0.09 No 5.16* Yes 0.16 No 2.58 No 
Ireland 3.15 No 6.21** Yes 5.08* Yes 3.06 No 
Italy 1.85 No 2.58 No 9.60*** Yes 0.43 No 
Japan 0.14 No 1.34 No 0.20 No 2.72 No 
Netherlands 7.95** Yes 4.52 No 8.78** Yes 8.37** Yes 
Portugal 6.95** Yes 3.00 No 11.82*** Yes 2.11 No 
Spain 4.84* Yes 3.48 No 1.23 No 17.22*** Yes 
Sweden 3.02 No 5.09* Yes 1.69 No 1.13 No 
United Kingdom 1.87 No 0.50 No 1.75 No 2.85 No 
United States 9.16** Yes 2.48 No 3.49 No 1.22 No 
Note: In the case of standard Granger-causality tests the null is of non-Granger causality. These tests are based on a VAR with lag equal to 2 has identified using different lag-
length criteria. In the case of the Toda-Yamamoto tests the null is of non-Granger causality. These tests are based on a VAR(3) – see main text for details.  Chi-squared 




TABLE 5.b Causality tests – Primary Balance and (lagged) Debt 
Country\relation Standard Granger causality Toda-Yamamoto 
 sBt →−1  
Yes/No Bst →−1  
Yes/No sBt →−1  
Yes/No Bst →−1  
Yes/No 
Australia 1.06 No 3.71 No 0.33 No 0.52 No 
Austria 2.09 No 0.33 No 4.16* Yes 0.19 No 
Belgium 14.99*** Yes 1.78 No 15.48*** Yes 0.45 No 
Canada 13.35*** Yes 2.53 No 6.42** Yes 0.96 No 
Denmark 5.29* Yes 1.69 No 8.81** Yes 2.83 No 
Finland 4.31 No 9.14** Yes 4.84* Yes 3.95 No 
France 1.09 No 3.50 No 9.77*** Yes 2.86 No 
Germany 2.68 No 1.53 No 2.12 No 1.01 No 
Greece 12.98*** Yes 3.05 No 9.94*** Yes 0.16 No 
Ireland 6.37** Yes 2.27 No 0.62 No 9.25*** Yes 
Italy 17.04*** Yes 4.58* Yes 5.73* Yes 3.91 No 
Japan 1.15 No 6.79** Yes 6.04** Yes 12.59*** Yes 
Netherlands 0.65 No 2.10 No 13.23*** Yes 5.35* Yes 
Portugal 1.60 No 1.87 No 1.95 No 2.06 No 
Spain 5.90* Yes 1.77 No 1.31 No 7.01** Yes 
Sweden 4.70* Yes 2.53 No 12.2*** Yes 3.32 No 
United Kingdom 3.77 No 12.56*** Yes 2.09 No 16.09*** Yes 
United States 1.24 No 2.02 No 10.44*** Yes 2.93 No 
Note: see Table 5.a. 
 
Table 6: Pedroni (2004) panel cointegration tests 
 relation Revenues and Expenditures (lagged) Debt and Primary 
Balance 
(lagged) Debt-mean deviation 
and Primary Balance 
  No trend Trend No trend Trend No trend Trend 
Within-
dimension 
Panel v  3.42 1.15 5.29 2.85 5.12 2.85 
Panel ρ  -2.93* -1.82* -3.98* -3.48* -3.78* -3.4* 
Panel PP -2.61* -2.87* -3.07* -3.83* -2.92* -3.74* 
Panel ADF -2.51* -2.75* -1.72 -1.91 -1.72 -1.92 
Between-
dimension 
Group ρ  -1.80 -0.55 -2.91* -1.58 -2.89* -1.57 
Group PP -2.50* -2.48* -2.86* -3.15* -2.81* -3.12* 
Group ADF -2.51* -3.17* -1.81 -1.80 -1.93 -1.83 
Notes: The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. Under the null all the statistics are distributed as standard Normal distributions. An asterisk (*) indicates 
rejection at the 10% level or better. 
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Table 7: Panel estimates of the cointegrating relationship: FMOLS in Pedroni (2000, 2001) 
Country\relation Revenues and Expenditures (lagged) Debt and Primary Balance (lagged) Debt-mean deviation and Primary Balance 
 FMOLS FMOLS FMOLS 
 β  t-stat β  t-stat β  t-stat 
Australia 
0.60** 2.47 0.17*** 4.59 0.05 0.91 
Austria 
0.69*** 14.98 0.03* 1.98 0.08*** 5.14 
Belgium 
0.30* 1.80 0.11*** 5.16 0.15** 3.58 
Canada 
0.35** 2.34 0.02 0.55 0.09** 2.22 
Denmark 
0.63*** 4.78 -0.06 -1.51 -0.01 -0.24 
Finland 
0.68*** 10.01 0.05 1.25 0.01 0.95 
France 
0.69*** 14.25 0.00 0.12 0.06** 2.72 
Germany 
0.53*** 6.50 0.08** 3.66 0.11** 3.68 
Greece 
0.67*** 6.54 0.04 0.69 0.11** 3.10 
Ireland 
0.40** 2.65 0.07** 2.57 0.07*** 4.94 
Italy 
-0.14 -0.45 0.01 0.37 -0.04* -2.19 
Japan 
0.52*** 4.28 -0.03 -3.15 0.06 1.45 
Netherlands 
0.65*** 16.06 0.05* 1.59 0.04* 1.63 
Portugal 
0.84** 11.87 0.01 0.48 -0.00 -0.07 
Spain 
0.76*** 9.85 0.01 0.17 0.09 1.23 
Sweden 
0.50*** 5.52 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.56 
United Kingdom 
0.34** 3.36 0.07* 1.83 -0.01 -0.17 
United States 
0.24 1.52 -0.00 -0.07 0.04 1.23 
Panel 0.51*** 27.93 0.03*** 4.76 0.05*** 7.22 
Notes: The regression equations correspond to (10) and (11) as discussed in the main text. t-stat. stands for t-statistics. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 8: Panel Long-run Causality (Pedroni) 
 
Panel A:  
itit RGG →:1λ  itit GGR →:2λ  21 /λλ−
 
 Estimate Test p-value Estimate Test p-value median 
Group mean 0.14 0.24 0.60 0.34 2.31 0.01 -0.55 
Lamba-Pearson  47.35 0.10  145.39 0.00 0.42 
Panel B:  
itit sB →−11 :λ  12 : +→ itit Bsλ  21 /λλ−
 
 Estimate Test p-value Estimate Test p-value median 
Group mean 0.66 1.56 0.06 -0.42 -1.18 0.12 0.97 
Lamba-Pearson  104.58 0.00  90.64 0.00 0.41 
 
 Note: Panel A explores the causality relation between government revenues and expenditures. Panel B explores the causality relation between (lagged) 
public debt and primary balance. For the full sample considered above there are two rows, one for the group mean based test, and one for the lambda-
Pearson based test. Columns 2-4 report these for tests based on the parameter 
1λ  , which reflected the presence or absence of long-run causality 
running from expenditures to revenues. The second column reports the panel point estimate, which exists only for the group mean, not for the lambda-
Pearson. The third column reports the corresponding panel test statistics and the fourth column repors the p-value for outcome of the panel test 
statistic. The next three columns repeat this same pattern for analogous tests based on the parameter
2λ , which reflects the presence or absence of 
long-run causality running from revenues to expenditures. Finally, the last column reports the group median point estimate of the sign ratio in the first 
row, with the simulated standard error reported in parenthesis in the second row. 
 
 38 
Table 9: Pooled OLS estimation of (10) with dummy for financial crises 
 
Equation (10) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged debt 0.011**  0.014***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
Lagged debt mean dev.  0.031***  0.038*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
FC dummy (additive) -3.145*** -3.277***   
 (0.621) (0.653)   
FC interaction (times debt)   -0.049*** -0.145*** 
   (0.007) (0.023) 
Constant -0.463 0.120 -0.711** -0.021 
 (0.299) (0.128) (0.307) (0.129) 
Observations 552 552 543 543 
R-squared 0.071 0.116 0.087 0.131 
Note: Pooled OLS estimation of Eq.(10) using as regressor either lagged debt or lagged debt-mean deviation together with additive or multiplicative 
dummy for financial crises (FC). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. . *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
